Skip to main content
Refinery operator at dusk reviewing a control-room HMI; warm tungsten light against cool concrete and steel.
FOR REFINING & PETROCHEM

Your CMMS knows what fails twice.
It doesn't know why.

Sovel reads the work-order narrative, the shift log, and the Slack message — then proposes findings a named reviewer approves. The audit artifact PSM §1910.119(l) requires. Autonomous-write competitors can't produce it.

§ 02 — The named pain

Three repeat-failure shapes
every refining reliability lead recognises.

01

Bad-actor pumps

P-204A trips at 03:00. Day shift restarts it. It trips again the next month, and the month after. The real fix lives in a single Slack message from a process engineer who left two years ago — outside the CMMS, outside the reviewer's reach, outside the audit trail.

Mechanism · Knowledge concentration / post-retirement rediscovery
02

Compressor surge recurrence

K-101 surges three times in six months. Each event reads as a low-suction-pressure trip in the CMMS. The shift logbook from event two names the upstream cooling-tower fan. The third reviewer never sees the second log — different shift, different system, no link.

Mechanism · Shift-handover gap
03

Alarm flood at unit upset

The FCC unit goes upset and generates 740 alarms in 10 minutes — well above the EEMUA 191 ceiling. To keep the unit in service, the operator silently disables three nuisance interlocks. The interlock-disable is the load-bearing knowledge. It lives in nobody's procedure.

Mechanism · Operator-overridden setpoint
§ 03 — Regulatory anchor matrix

Mapped against OSHA PSM 1910.119
paragraph by paragraph.

Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals — sub-paragraphs Sovel maps against.

Paragraph
Sub-paragraph
Sovel covers
Citation
§1910.119(e)
Process Hazard Analysis
Surfaces knowledge gaps that change PHA scope; flags repeat findings the next PHA revalidation will see.
CSB 2007-05-I-TX — operating procedures not maintained as unit conditions changed.
§1910.119(f)
Operating Procedures
Detects procedure drift via WO narrative + shift-log cross-reference; drafts reviewer-approved SOP deltas with named-author attribution.
CSB 2010-08-I-WA — heat-exchanger procedure did not reflect known operating practice.
§1910.119(j)
Mechanical Integrity
Bad-actor surfacing, repeat-failure cluster detection, evidence anchors on procedure-bound MI work orders.
CSB 2018-01-I-WI — FCC mechanical-integrity inspection gaps preceded loss of containment.
§1910.119(l)
Management of Change
Verify-in-place records as the MOC closure artifact: named reviewer, evidence anchors, immutable trail per change.
OSHA Refinery National Emphasis Program — CPL 03-00-021 (MOC authorization records audited).
§ 04 — Reviewer surface

The same inbox your safety lead approves from
— architected against OSHA PSM 1910.119.

Fig. 02 — Reviewer Inbox · liveFOR REFINING & PETROCHEM

Reviewer inbox surfacing a repeat-failure cluster on FCC slide-valve P-204. Each row is a knowledge-risk finding Sovel proposes; the named reviewer approves, defers, or rejects. Approval emits a verify-in-place record that satisfies PSM §1910.119(l) Management of Change closure.

§ 05 — Pre-pilot

Pre-pilot Knowledge Risk Assessment for refining.

Two-week scoped engagement against one CMMS export. One named Sovel reviewer, one substrate scan, one auditable bundle — mapped to PSM 1910.119 sub-paragraphs your safety lead already audits against.

Delivers
  • Read-only ingest of one CMMS export, scoped to a single asset class.
  • Reviewer walkthrough of one closure record on a 45-minute call.
  • Signed PDF and live evidence bundle within five working days.
  • PSM 1910.119 (e / f / j / l) coverage matrix specific to your data.
Does NOT deliver
  • No autonomous writes to procedures, MOCs, or work orders.
  • CMMS replacement.
  • Generic chatbot or open-ended Q&A surface.
  • Cloud-only deployment (on-prem available — required for buyers under tight data-residency posture).